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Introduction
Multiculturalism has become an increasingly popular policy option among western states.
Multiculturalism has been predominantly adopted as a liberal theory. However, there are many
opportunities for multiculturalism to work against liberal values, such as all humans being worthy
of equal dignity and respect. Throughout this paper, I will explore existing theories heavily used
in multiculturalism and propose an alternative to better liberal theories of multiculturalism to offer
greater equity alternatives that capture the participation of minority members of minority groups.
Multiculturalism in itself is not a liberal theory, and so, as we go on to explore liberal potentials,
it must be with the understanding that multiculturalism has the potential to work against the
individual rights and dignities of citizens. This essay will propose a theory of multiculturalism
heavily rooted in feminist theories of dialogic ethics and will show how a heavily masculine
conception of the citizen seeks to oppress women belonging to both majority and minority cultures
in the same way that the majority culture can oppress minority cultures. In this situation, the state
and theories of multiculturalism must seek the special protection of women within minority
cultural groups to ensure their individual rights and dignities are protected and respected. Above
all else, I will be defending a liberal theory of multiculturalism where the state must always
maintain the protections of individual rights of citizens over group rights while being open to
considering and granting group rights where there is no conflict with the rights of any individual
group members or individuals who exist outside of the group
In Chapter 1, I will begin discussing the conceptual realities of culture. I will be asking two
questions. First, why is culture valuable? Second, in what way is culture valuable to the individual,
and how can the cosmopolitan alternative diminish the value we derive from cultures? Chapter 2
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will seek to better understand theories of multiculturalism as it exists in its broadest sense. In this
section, I will explore concepts of recognition, group rights, and the limitations of group rights
from a liberal perspective. It is here where the foundation of understanding multiculturalism will
be formed. Chapter 3 will particularly explore multiculturalism from a feminist lens. It is in this
final section that critical sex-based evaluations of culture will be explored. The deliberative
feminist approach will also be heavily utilized to further my dialogic ethics theory, particularly
regarding minorities within minority groups. It will be through understanding the assumptions of
masculine superiority within dialogic traditions that will show how much of the dialogue on
multiculturalism fails to account for the female citizen in the same way men are accounted for. A
better understanding of the masculine superiority assumptions of dialogue will lead the discussion
to the right of exit by cultural minority group members, exploring how the dominant approach to
the right of exit can easily work against the interest and individual rights of women belonging to
cultural minority groups. This will bring us to our final discussion, where I seek to understand
whether the dominant approach to the right to exit is a means to exclude women from cultural
dialogue or an unintended consequence of unrealized oppression.

Chapter 1: Culture
The cultures we grow up in as children play a formative role in our lives, even if we depart
from our original cultures later in life. Culture provides us with a common language to speak so
that we may communicate with our surrounding community. Not only does it provide us with a
language, but our cultures also provide us with a vocabulary. Through the connection to my
Brazilian culture, I was introduced to the word “saudade,” as my father often used the word when
reminiscing about his life in Brazil. When directly translated from Portuguese to English, saudade
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means “longing.” However, in Portuguese, it means more than that, as the English language does
not have an equivalent word with such emotional presence, so we must translate it into a word
where much emotion and intention are lost. For Saudade, it is not just to long for something; it is
to have a deep emotional feeling of loss in the connection of something or someone, leaving the
individual with a deep melancholic longing. This feeling even attaches itself to expatriate
nationals, such as my father, who maintain this deep sense of romantic nationalism for their
country and culture of origin. Culture is a term which has yet to reach a universal agreement,
leaving it with many unsettled contestations. In this contested state, I will also attempt to make a
clear case for how we ought to conceive of culture. I see three central components to culture:
language and vocabulary, the lived experience of the individuals belonging to one group, and a
belief system.
I will propose a dialogue-focused theory of culture and multiculturalism that purports that language
and vocabulary are central features of cultures, as this is the means group members may negotiate
the terms of their culture, making each member a central and important determiner of the culture’s
future.1 However, culture is more than conversation. Culture also encompasses lived experiences.
Belonging to a culture is to belong to an experience, and the closer one’s membership to a certain
culture, the more personal the experience is. For example, as a person of Scottish-Brazilian
heritage, I feel a warm familiarity with each culture’s music. However, it is only when I exist
within one of the cultures that I may truly engage with the culture’s lived experiences. The shared

1

Patti Tamara Lenard, “Culture,” ed. Edward N. Zalta, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Winter, 2020; 5.
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experience of belonging to and participating in a particular group’s social formation is yet another
central feature of culture;2 belonging to something that exists outside of ourselves.
Finally, the presence of a belief system is necessary to the conception of culture. While this belief
system need not incorporate conceptions of divinity, there must be an identifiable set of morals
within each culture. We can only begin to distinguish cultures from one another by accounting for
the belief systems of cultures and their practices, which stem from their beliefs.3 As Parekh asserts,
cultures do not have a “Herderian spirit” and should be seen as more than the sort of art culture
may produce. Further, it would be a mistake to essentialize the belief systems of cultures, as the
language and vocabulary of cultures exist because of the inevitable disagreement that arises from
groups of individuals coming together to form communities and create cultures. Language and
vocabulary are central to culture because it is among these components that we may negotiate the
terms of our cultures when internal disagreements arise.

Why is Culture Valuable?
It is important to begin this discussion by understanding why culture is of any value. If we do not
need culture to be fulfilled, if there is no value in culture, there is little reason to spend time
understanding its nuances. I propose that we should see culture through two lenses to gain a better
understanding of what exactly is at stake. The first lens of culture is its most abstract form; this is
where we think of culture as a group-exclusive phenomenon that exists when many individuals
form a group, believe in, contribute to and live out their lives according to a set of beliefs
concerning the good life. It is in this definition that all cultures may universally exist. In this first

2

Alan Patten, Equal Recognition: The Moral Foundations of Minority Rights (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2014), 39.
3
Bhikhu C. Parekh, Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory (Basingstoke: Macmillan,
2002), 149.
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lens, we can understand whether culture is an intrinsic value. The second lens of culture is much
more tangible; this is where the nuances of cultural diversity exist, making it near impossible to
create a universal definition that is true for all cultures. We will determine whether culture is an
instrumental value in the second lens.
An intrinsic value comes from something being valuable for its own sake.4 An instrumental value
is something to value for the sake of something else, which seeks to find intrinsic value or the
Good “at which all things aim.”5 As humans are social beings, it may seem prima facie that culture
has a value for its own sake, but I argue that culture is an instrumental value; it provides us with
the means and opportunity to fulfil intrinsic values. The instrumental value of culture fulfils our
intrinsic desire for security – by creating communities, individual members may build familiarity
and reliability – and it fulfils our desires for friendship and community – by creating a foundation
for a group of people to form bonds of trust and understanding. From its first lens, we may say that
culture is not an intrinsic value because the good it creates is rooted in other intrinsic values –
security, cooperation and friendship. However, culture’s instrumental value remains extremely
important, as it is an effective means to contribute to human flourishing. Looking at culture from
its second lens – which includes the nuances of all cultures in existence – we may further claim
that culture is not valuable in itself because it also has the potential to be the cause of harm. In
determining the instrumental value of culture, I see it fitting to adopt Joseph Raz’s valueindividualism, which “claims that the explanation and justification of the goodness or badness of
anything derives ultimately from its contribution, actual or possible, to human life and its quality.”6

4

Aristotle and Roger Crisp, Nicomachean Ethics (Cambridge, U.K; New York: Cambridge University Press,
2000),1094a.
5
Aristotle and Crisp, Nicomachean Ethics, 1094a.
6
Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford University Press, 1988), 194.
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Cultures can create and maintain unjust behaviours – such as murdering children or practicing
slavery – which would be wrong because these practices cause unjust pain, suffering, and loss
among individuals. Unjust pain, suffering, or loss can make achieving the good life difficult, if not
impossible. Cultures can also engage in just and virtuous behaviours – such as upholding the
respect and dignity of every individual. Since culture can be the cause of value or detriment, we
may accept that cultures are of instrumental value because of the potential it has in creating
relationship-dependent values, which consist in creating a life supported by community to produce
or maintain our institutions and practices, which will go toward shaping and negotiating the
collective conditions of such culture’s being.7

Claims to Culture
Minority cultures must have a fair opportunity to approach the state to request special
accommodation rights, exemption rights or any other sort of group(differentiated) right. This
opportunity must exist because minority cultures are already at a disadvantage; they belong to a
culture where their state most likely lacks a sufficient understanding of. There are two forms of
these group claims: group rights and group differentiated rights. Group rights are rights groups
may make a claim to, which can only be experienced collectively, such as making a claim to selfdetermination. Group-differentiated rights allow individual members within the group to
enjoy accommodations, exemptions or recognition rights, that cannot be enjoyed by nonmembers.8 For example, special hunting rights – which would exempt members of a particular
culture from existing hunting laws – given to Indigenous groups are group-differentiated rights

7

Margaret Moore, A Political Theory of Territory, First issued as an Oxford University Press paperback, Oxford
Political Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 195.
8
Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, 45.
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because hunting can only be performed by individual group members and cannot be performed
by the group as a single collective agent.
Many have challenged the legitimacy cultural claims should play in cases of minority rights claims.
I would like to address the criticisms Sarah Song raised, as she presents a strong case critical of
cultural legitimacy, in which my response to her claims may show how cultural claims ought to be
taken as a legitimate claim option. One of Song’s criticisms of culture, and in particular, its present
use in political theory, is that it is a “notoriously overbroad concept, and all of these categories
[religion, language, ethnicity, nationality and race] have been subsumed by or taken to be
synonymous with the concept of culture.”9 Song is particularly critical of using cultural claims in
criminal cases, and while I agree that culture should not be accepted as a defence for unjust murder
or harm10, I believe there is a place for legitimate cultural claims that exist outside of defences to
criminal acts.
While I agree with Song’s main concern that religion, language, ethnicity, nationality and race are
not words that can be interchanged with culture, I do believe there is a presence of culture in almost
all of these concepts, and so its presence should not be ignored. Song states, "Religious observance
is shaped by local and national culture.”11 Song also argues that while we may be able to grant
accommodation to religion because they are justificatory structures, culture does not have the same
defence mechanisms.12 At this point, I agree with both of Song’s claims. Culture is not a
justification or an excuse for unjust acts. Just because one’s ancestors have lived in a way which

Sarah Song, “The Subject of Multiculturalism: Culture, Religion, Language, Ethnicity, Nationality, and Race?,” in
New Waves in Political Philosophy, (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2009), 177.
10
Sarah Song, “Majority Norms, Multiculturalism, and Gender Equality,” in American Political Science Review,
(2005).
11
Song, “The Subject of Multiculturalism”, 179.
12
Song, “The Subject of Multiculturalism”, 179-180.
9
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inspired one’s current lifestyle – and the lifestyle of all their predecessors – is not a necessary or
sufficient argument to justify the continuation of any practice that eventually comes to be seen as
morally unacceptable under liberal values of respecting the dignity and rights of every individual.13
However, my divergence with Song’s claims begins with a point centred on the belief systems
component of how I conceive of culture. If religion has no culture, then it can only be considered
spirituality. The most basic – yet oversimplified – difference between religion and spirituality is
that religion is a group-based belief system where the spiritual practices are agreed upon by all
who practice. However, spirituality is a more individual-based phenomenon where one feels
“closeness and connectedness to the sacred.”14 We can see culture as a necessary feature of religion
since there is a defined group composed of many individuals agreeing to a set of beliefs and
practices. However, religion becomes more than culture when it fuses spiritual attributes into its
belief systems. So, while Song says we should not blur the lines between religion and culture by
making cultural claims to religious beliefs or practices, the truth is that the lines will be blurred
where religion is pronouncedly present in a culture. When looking at religious claims, the state
may also have to acknowledge, in dialogue, the cultural presence in religious claims for the claim
to be understood in its most full and fair representation.
Another point of contention Song raises surrounding cultural claims is that of national minorities.
According to Song, national minorities can use “historical injustice or present discrimination and
disadvantaged experienced by a particular group, rather than making claims to culture.”15
However, this raises the question, do national minorities need to be victims of historical injustice
13

Brian M. Barry, Culture and Equality: An Egalitarian Critique of Multiculturalism, Repr (Cambridge: Polity, 2008):
258.
14
Everett L. Worthington et al., “Religion and Spirituality,” Journal of Clinical Psychology, 67, no. 2 (February 2011):
205.
15
Song, “The Subject of Multiculturalism”, 191.
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or present discrimination for their cultural claims to be valid? Is multiculturalism or the
accommodation of national minority groups based solely on the premise of corrective justice? In
short, the answer to both questions is no; national minorities have more than corrective justice
claims to choose from in seeking and justifying special accommodations or acknowledgments
from the state. While the merits of corrective justice certainly can assist in building a case for
national minority rights, it is not a necessary feature for cultural claims to be met.
While national minorities may find they can use corrective justice claims to strengthen their case,
it is not a necessary feature. Will Kymlicka notes that the claims made by national minorities to
self-governing rights are not a transitory measure nor a measure to target oppressions that may one
day be eradicated.16 The claims made by national minorities are claims to culture because it is their
culture they are seeking to either maintain, protect, or liberate their culture through a transfer of
power, giving legitimate jurisdiction over their culture and practices.17 Margaret Moore calls this
claim a collective right of occupancy, wherein individuals have collective identities, which are the
identities that form culture. The aspirations of the collective identity are of importance to the lives
of the individuals within the collective.18
On the other end of Song’s argument, we must ask: what if there is a strong claim to corrective
justice grounded in culture, but the accommodation request of the minority group is unjust, and
should not be permitted by the liberal state? The short response to this question is that if a group’s
cultural claim limits the individual rights of any group member, the liberal state should not allow
such practices to exist within their jurisdictions, even in self-determining jurisdictions. Above all
16

Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights, Oxford Political Theory (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 2003); 30.
17
Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman, “Return of the Citizen: A Survey of Recent Work on Citizenship Theory,”
Ethics 104 (1994): 372.
18
Moore, A Political Theory of Territory; 40.
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else, the liberal democratic state must prioritize rights and protections concerning individuals.
Group rights are only justifiable because of the benefit they may provide individuals within groups.
The state must see the individual as a separable agent from their group for at least two reasons.
First, individuals must be held accountable for their actions and not the actions of others. If a group
member were to commit domestic violence against their spouse, it would be wrong to charge every
member of the group; if the state does not separate individuals from their groups, the importance
of being accountable for one’s actions would be much more convoluted. Second, there is no
guarantee that individuals will remain in their cultural groups indefinitely; some may leave and
return later or never again. If the liberal democratic state cannot separate the individuals from the
group, this makes the right of exit – from one’s group – very difficult, if not impossible. If the state
places the group's right to cultural preservation above the individual’s right of exit, this will have
detrimental consequences for the minorities of these minority groups – often women and children.
Claims to culture must only exist in liberal states under the assumption that individual members
are separable, individual agents from their groups of membership.
Let us return to the initial question of what to do with a corrective justice claim that seeks to
warrant a deeply unjust action. Say, one hundred years ago, a national minority group used to
practice sacrificial cannibalism, and since then, the national majority forced the group into slavery
and stripped them of their cultural ties, forcefully assimilating them into the majority culture. There
is a case for corrective justice; the majority culture should not have enslaved the minority group,
as slavery strips humans of their autonomy, dignity and self-respect.19 Here, the national minority
group could appeal to corrective justice, where past injustices are recognized at the very least and
are granted almost full autonomy at the very most. While enslavement and forced assimilation are

19

Thus, rejecting any potential opportunity or capacity for individual human flourishing among these groups.
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unjust, the liberal democratic state does not have a duty to permit the national minority group to
continue their sacrificial cannibalistic practices, as they existed before their enslavement. Indeed,
the state must ensure this practice ceases to continue if the group is to be granted any sort of selfdetermination right. The rationale goes back to Mill’s justification of state paternalism: “But by
selling himself for a slave, he abdicates his liberty; he foregoes any future use of it, beyond that
single act. He therefore, defeats, in his case, the very purpose which is the justification of allowing
him to dispose of himself. He is no longer free.”20 Individuals cannot consent to forego inalienable
rights, as the very purpose of rights are to protect the liberty and autonomy of individuals to ensure
all have an equal opportunity to seek human flourishing. The liberal state seeks to maintain and
improve these potentials for human flourishing and so must prohibit all cases of rights claims that
seek to revoke these individual rights, even if the very claimant asks for her individual rights to be
revoked.
While slavery and human sacrifice are two different categorical immoralities, they share immoral
similarities, such as the immorality surrounding an agent’s abdication of any future liberty, which
would also happen should someone volunteer themselves to be sacrificed. This abdication cannot
be allowed by the liberal democratic state because the very “liberal ideal is a society of free and
equal individuals.”21 Further, the liberal state must not grant any minority claim where the group's
members have restricted basic individual liberties, as group rights must never supersede basic
individual rights.22 So, while the historically oppressed national minority may be entitled to
recognition and redistributive justice, I believe Song places too much legitimizing power on
historical injustice arguments. While historical injustice is an important point to consider when the

20

John Stuart Mill and Gertrude Himmelfarb, On Liberty, Penguin Classics (Penguin, 1974): 184.
Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, 92.
22
Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, 152.
21
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claim is unjustifiable by liberal principles, it is a separate issue from a cultural claim; groups cannot
be entitled to continue practices that limit all future autonomy of the individuals within their group
because they were victims of historical injustice. The presence of cultural claims often plays a
greater role than corrective justice, shown through examples where the absence of corrective
justice from a national minority’s claim need not weaken the sentiments of the claim. The latter
example also exemplified how corrective justice claims are not sufficient. The nature and
substance of the cultural claim are more important than an account of historical injustice in
determining whether the liberal state will accept claims made by cultural minority groups.

Why we Should (not) Live the Cosmopolitan Alternative
For cultures to exist outside of an abstract idea, these cultures must be composed of individuals
who intend to be permanent members.23 However, there seems to be a different conception of
culture, particularly from the perspective of cosmopolitanism. Jeremy Waldron explains one
cosmopolitan perspective of culture and cultural membership, which believes we need not belong
to any culture to be fulfilled. In his paper, Waldron addresses cultural minorities whose cultures
are at risk of perishing. Waldron asks if we, as humans, need to belong to the particular cultures
we were born into and whether there is a right-based claim to cultural survival on account of
necessity.24 While I believe individuals can change cultures, I also believe that Waldron’s proposed
alternative is not sufficient to fulfil the cultural desires of individuals, nor is his account of culture
adequately conceived.

23

I say intend, because it is reasonable to assume that some individuals will exit their cultural groups.
Jeremy Waldron, “Minority Cultures and the Cosmopolitan Alternative,” University of Michigan Journal of Law
Reform 25, no. 3 & 4 (1992): 762.
24
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I have two particular qualms with Waldron’s cosmopolitan alternative. First, I do not think
Waldron’s conception of culture is accurate, as it lacks necessary components, such as an
identifiable community, authentic communication or the presence of a belief system. Second,
while Waldron is sympathetic to the harms that may come to individuals from cultural loss, he
does not provide a realistic alternative to offset these potential costs.
While Waldron does not provide a clear definition of culture, he does seem to think that an
identifiable community with stable membership is not a necessary component for human
flourishing through the use of culture. For Waldron, it is no longer necessary for individuals to
have a group-based interdependence in today’s contemporary times because “the full extent of
human interdependence is now global, not national.”25 We can find this same type of belonging
and dependence in the global community, rather than belonging to an identifiable group, with
people we have come to trust through time and experience. I find it quite difficult to agree with
Waldron’s idea because, in his notion of global interdependence, there is no realistic expectation
of any age or group of agents to seek out the best interest of an individual they know nothing about.
There are no ties that incentivize others to care about a stranger’s interest, other than some primary
connection-based human rights to respect and dignity.
In Waldron’s most direct addressing of language and culture, he says, “We are made by our
languages, our literature, our cultures, our science, our religions, our civilization-and these are
human entities that go far beyond national boundaries and exist, if they exist anywhere, simply in
the world.”26 However, we are not made up of all languages, all literature or all cultures. We are

25
26

Waldron, “Minority Cultures and the Cosmopolitan Alternative”, 771.
Waldron, “Minority Cultures and the Cosmopolitan Alternative”, 778
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composed of a particular language, particular literature, and particular culture. Cultures and our
belongings to them may only occur if we can identify and distinguish one culture from another.27
As a Canadian, the only way for me to exist with the majority culture is if I were to sufficiently
speak English or French if I were to reside in Quebec. As an unfortunate Canadian who does not
speak French, I would have no means of authentically existing as a member of the dominant culture
of Quebec because their culture exists, in its most authentic form, in the French language. While
Waldron mentions the relationship between culture and language – including ideas from Aristotle
and Charles Taylor28 – he does not adequately address this relationship. Waldron’s conception that
those who have lost their culture may just “draw our allegiances from here, there, and everywhere”
29

does not address the criticism that one must sufficiently speak the culture’s language, at the very

least, to gain an authentic cultural experience, that comes most often in the form of membership.
Further, Waldron neglects to address the potential cognitive harms associated with his idea that
we may happily live with cognitive dissonance and that it may never be a concern for us to come
to terms with completely conflicting ideas of the good life.30 While it would be hard for “bits of
culture to come into our lives from different sources,” if we cannot speak the language or read the
literature of the culture, what may be harder is belonging to radically different cultures, all with
radically different expectations all at once.

27

Parekh, Rethinking Multiculturalism, 149,
Waldron, “Minority Cultures and the Cosmopolitan Alternative”, 772, 778.
29
Waldron, “Minority Cultures and the Cosmopolitan Alternative”, 788.
30
Which can be seen in “Minority Cultures and the Cosmopolitan Alternative” when Waldron says, “Bits of cultures
come into our lives from different sources, and there is no guarantee that they will all fit together.” (788), and “The
threat, of course, is what we vulgarly call schizophrenia; but that may be better understood as radical conflict or
dissonance rather than mere unregulated plurality.” (791)
28
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Waldron’s Unrealistic Expectations
The most important component of Waldron’s proposal is ill-addressed; that we can simply
belong to the world and “owe a debt to the world and the global community … as well as whatever
we owe to any particular region, country, nation or tribe.”31 There are two issues here. First, only
a certain type of individual can truly live this sort of cosmopolitan alternative, and this certain type
of individual is not common. There is no doubt in my mind that Waldron can truly live out this
alternative he proposes. He is an extremely creative intellectual who has been very successful in
his career and most likely has drawn his identity from bits of culture throughout his travels. But
what about the rest of us? What about those of average intelligence (or below), who do not have
the financial means to spend their free time travelling the world, or who find the most value in
their primary cultural memberships? “The opportunities people have for getting themselves highly
paid work and socially attractive positions strongly depend on their ability to integrate themselves
in the majority culture, simply because it is the culture where the main economic activities take
place.”32 The individual belonging to minority cultures facing cultural extinction is already at a
disadvantage, which often leaves them with fewer opportunities than their fellow citizens who
belong to their country’s majority culture.
Second, while certain people may be able to collect these “bits of culture” as they travel about the
world, it is the individuals who situate themselves or draw their allegiance to one culture, who live
in that culture as members, who allow those cultures to remain in existence. If everyone lived the
cosmopolitan life, cultures would cease to exist. If this is true, taking bits of culture from
everywhere will only leave inauthentic experiences of the cultures they take bits from, never

31
32

Waldron, “Minority Cultures and the Cosmopolitan Alternative”, 778.
Andrei Marmor, “Equality and Minority Cultures,” Bar Ilan University Press, Democratic Culture, 3 (2000): 164.
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fulfilling their cultural membership desires. While Waldron’s proposal surely is possible for a
small sect of humanity, a consequentialist consideration will find Waldron’s proposal to be a nonstarter, if what is being proposed is an alternative, everyone may have the capacity to authentically
live. Taking membership in a culture requires contributing to and benefitting from cultural
structure; if everyone were capable of and desired to live the cosmopolitan alternative, culture
would cease to exist.

Chapter 2: Multiculturalism
Multiculturalism is not a liberal theory in and of itself. However, the widespread adoption
by liberal states has created an assumption around multiculturalism that it is a naturally liberal
theory. While most multiculturalist countries are liberal, multiculturalism does have the theoretical
capacity to go against the pillars of liberalism. For example, while liberalism prioritizes individual
rights over group rights, a non-liberal theory of multiculturalism may use cultural groups to defend
arguments for overriding individual rights. A non-liberal theory may present an idea where the
ends justify the means, using cultural preservationist claims based on “the greater good” to defend
how the state may supersede the individual rights of some for the benefit of many within a
particular cultural group. Before anything else, multiculturalism is a policy option that states may
choose to adopt as a means to respond to challenges associated with culturally diverse societies,
where "some level of public recognition, support or accommodation" is provided to cultural
minority groups by the state.33

Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Odysseys: Navigating the New International Politics of Diversity (Oxford ; New York:
Oxford University Press, 2009), 16.
33
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The theory of multiculturalism I put forward here is liberal. However, if we are seeking a liberal
theory of multiculturalism, it must be with the knowledge that multiculturalism has the potential
to harm liberal values, so we must seek to form a theory which strongly protects the rights of
individuals before anything else. Multiculturalism promotes the idea that cultural minorities should
not have to face coercive assimilation and should be free within reasonable limits to sustain their
cultural identity.34 Belonging to a cultural minority must not be grounds for discrimination, as all
citizens – regardless of their cultural identity – are entitled to equal treatment by and under the
state. In this section, I will show how dialogue is an attractive option for liberal theories of
multiculturalism, how multiculturalism may be used to fulfil the respect and dignity of individuals
belonging to minority cultures and the parameters which ought to be set around group rights and
the threat of reductionism in culturally diverse societies.

Dialogue
Dialogue should be considered a central component of multiculturalism – facilitated by the
state for minority cultures attempting to gain a cultural claim – as it seeks to find social cohesion
in a culturally diverse society. In most cases, it should be assumed that the state does not adequately
understand most minority cultures within its borders. While the state has been created by and for
the majority culture, the same is not true for minority cultures. Liberal states and liberal theories
have always assumed the citizen shares the same language and national culture.35 Therefore, it is
in this unfamiliarity that minority cultures must educate the state on their particular culture through
dialogue if they wish to make a cultural claim. While it is not necessary for every minority culture
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to educate the state about their culture when a minority culture seeks to make a cultural claim for
recognition, exemptions, or group rights, a structured process of dialogue must occur, where the
minority cultural group must present a case for their claims.
While dialogue ethics should be considered a central component of multiculturalism, it does not
come without criticism. Before I conclude the discussion on dialogue for this section, I will address
the main criticism of the dialogue approach: Who should represent and speak for the group? While
the question is short, it is very difficult to answer, as it must ensure that all individual group
members' dignity, respect, and individual rights will be represented in dialogue and upheld in the
final decision.
Dialogue is central to multicultural theories, which seek a fuller understanding of creating and
maintaining a cohesive, culturally diverse society. Before the multicultural model, most western
states functioned by the nation-state model. The nation-state model believes that the state needs
civic unity to effectively defend against internal or external threats. It is also believed that this
unity can support the strengthening of the welfare state, as individuals within the nation will feel
a special communal bond among their compatriots. Another justification for the model is that
administrating a state with a culturally homogenous population will increase the ease of
government functioning.36 However, the multicultural state takes a cultural pluralist stance. In a
culturally plural state, the state views all cultures as equally worthy of respect, to the extent that
the culture does not cause or promote harm to the individual rights of citizens. A multicultural
state belongs to all citizens equally – regardless of cultural associations; it accepts that individuals
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should have equal access to state institutions and participate as “full and equal citizens in political
life, without having to hide or deny their ethnocultural identity."37
Because of this plural stance on culture, the multicultural state will inevitably be confronted by
requests from minority cultures that the state knows little of. In the particular situation of
multiculturalism where the state is confronted by unfamiliar cultures, dialogic ethics become a
necessary condition. Before a state agrees to a minority culture’s request, dialogue must begin with
the state and minority cultures, approaching the state with a rights claim, accommodation, or
recognition request. In the following sections, I will address how dialogue ethics will be a
fundamental tool used in claims for cultural recognition, accommodation, or group rights claims.
However, as of now, a deeper consideration will take place, considering the existing theories of
dialogue ethics, particularly from Bikhu Parekh.

Parekh’s Intercultural Dialogue and Criticisms
Bhikhu Parekh's proposal to improve the theory of multiculturalism is to incorporate a
tripartite process of intercultural dialogue.38 Parekh’s intercultural dialogue is composed of three
parts that must be fulfilled for the state to permit a cultural right claim. First, a practice must be so
important that it is bound to the culture. Second, if the practice seems utterly unacceptable, it must
interlock with other important practices, proving it is central to their way of life, which may be
damaged if prohibited. Finally, the spokesmen need to reach beyond their culture and appeal to the
values of the liberal society, so the state and society may be persuaded to permit the practice.
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Parekh sees intercultural dialogue as important when addressing the legitimacy of practices
conducted among cultural minority groups.39
In Parekh’s intercultural dialogue, there are two issues. First, Parekh’s justification and conditions
for cultural claims open the potential for individual rights to be violated on what seems to be a
claim to cultural preservation. One conceptual distinction we should remember for this issue is
between the voluntary participants and those impacted by it.40 Take the case of clitoridectomy on
female children; the individuals who seek special cultural permission from the state to perform
clitoridectomy on the female children of their cultural group are not the agents who are impacted
but the voluntary – often male – agents. Often, those making claims for exemption or
accommodations will not be the primarily impacted agent but a power-holding agent within the
minority culture who can potentially benefit from subordinate and oppressive accommodations or
exemptions. Even Parekh – who takes one of the most accommodative stances on clitoridectomy
among western theorists – draws the line of potential acceptability at children.41 While children
are helpless agents, they are also extremely unlikely to be the agent to approach the state for an
accommodation, for an autonomy-limiting medical procedure. While many cultures do engage in
clitoridectomy for cultural reasons related to virtue or hygiene, Parekh’s theory does not do enough
to adequately address the separation between voluntary participants and agents who are impacted.
Sometimes these two agents can be one person; perhaps a rational adult female will choose to have
a clitoridectomy procedure performed on her – in this case, she is both the voluntary participant
and the agent of impact. However, the same cannot be true for children; children do not have the
capacity to understand what it means to consent to life-changing aesthetic surgeries. It is for this
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reason that the state does not allow child marriages and enacts age of consent laws to engage in
sex. While Parekh would accept the example I provided, the distinction between voluntary
participant and primary agent of impact is a crucial – yet absent – consideration from Parekh’s
theory on dialogue. Further, the conceptual distinction between voluntary agent and primary
impacted agent should be present in all theories of dialogue that deal with claims to culture as a
mechanism to ensure the state adequately investigates potential opportunities for internal
oppression. If we value human rights as a non-negotiable, intrinsic moral value, there cannot be
exemptions or exceptions made, where the dignity and respect for the lives of individuals are
rebuked for fulfilling an instrumental value of cultural preservation.
The second concern I have with Parekh’s intercultural dialogue is his wording about cultural
representatives. To understand why cultural representatives as “spokesmen” are riddled with
issues, we should consider the claims of Susan Okin. If men are called to be the sole representatives
of cultural groups, especially those with strong patriarchal social structures, the women in these
groups face a detrimental threat to their welfare and individual rights. Okin raises the concern of
the role played by covert sexism, where cultures that are seemingly liberal in public may very well
be sexist in the private sphere.42 If we are to utilize dialogue as an ethical tool to fully understand
the claims made by cultural groups, we must hear from more than just the males of the culture.
Cultures are communal phenomena, and women are necessary actors in all cultures. Hearing from
the women within these minority cultural groups may not completely avoid threats to individual
liberties. However, it must be a necessary component of all liberal multicultural theories rooted in
dialogue to ensure the state provides due diligence in protecting all its citizens, especially those in
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the most insecure situations. Indeed, Parekh’s theory on dialogue ethics does not account for
minorities within minority cultural groups. We must consider the consequences of excluding
minorities within cultural minority groups, as their participation in dialogue is just as, if not more
integral than members who hold more power within their group. It is minorities within minority
groups we should seek to prioritize, as it is their rights, liberty and dignity that are most threatened
should a group be granted a rights claim that covertly seeks to subordinate or oppress the individual
minorities within the cultural minority group.

Fulfilling Respect and Dignity for Minority Cultures
Liberalism sees respect and dignity as two fundamental, universal principles which must apply
to every human. Liberal multiculturalism seeks to fulfil the individual’s respect and dignity
through recognizing an individual’s cultural identity and granting group rights where appropriate.
This section will analyze two components of this respect and dignity project: recognition and group
rights. Multiculturalism seeks to fulfil the respect and dignity of individuals, partly through the
recognition of minority cultures and permits the existence of group rights under conditions. A
dialogic process is the first step toward any sort of recognition or group rights claim; the state must
adequately learn the culture of the claimant in its most fair, honest, and respectful representation
for a meaningful decision to be established from the dialogue process.

Recognition
Recognition is an important component of any multicultural theory. Recognition of culture
helps individuals, groups, and outsiders gain a deeper, more dignified, and honest understanding
of minority cultural groups. Recognition of minority cultures can have benefits, extending to all
of society, including the state's majority culture. Cultural minorities benefit from their culture
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being recognized as it strengthens the feeling of dignity and respect by being acknowledged and
validated by the state. However, the state's official recognition of a particular minority culture also
presents opportunities for non-members of minority cultures to engage in recognition. Nonmembers can learn about the minority culture in its most honest and fair representation. The
recognition process weakens conceptions of otherness – where boundaries are made between
insiders and outsiders43 – and familiarizes minority cultures with outsiders, so they may have the
opportunity to appreciate it.
Multiculturalism is centred on creating a cohesive society encompassing many cultures, which
seeks to remove the feeling of otherness so people can live in diverse societies without suspicion
of neighbours who practise different religions or come from different countries. Suspicion or threat
often stems from feeling as though one does not know enough about a particular person or group.
Dialogue ethics seeks to structure communication in a way that educates organized ideas to
maintain respect, honesty, and fairness.44
Charles Taylor illustrates how the difference approach to recognition can come about if we
“recognize the unique identity” and distinctness of individuals in cultural minority groups if we
are to engage in the politics of difference.45 Recognition is important for those who seek it because
it is the driving force that allows individuals to feel dignified in their identities being validated. As
dominant groups may intentionally or inadvertently entrench their cultural authority by instilling
conceptions of superiority of the majority culture, minority cultures may come to feel culturally
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inferior and overpowered.46 Amy Gutmann extends Taylor’s argument to express how democratic
ideals – which ought to be upheld by the liberal state and embody ideals of human dignity and
mutual respect – must insist that all humans are of equal worth and “require more than equal
procedural rights for all.”47 Cultural minorities should not be respected because they are cultural
minorities; they should be respected as cultural minorities.

Group Rights
When a cultural group is seeking group rights, they are often a minority cultural group
either seeking to utilize the state’s power to restrict the liberty of its members on account of cultural
unity or seeking protection for the culture’s survival and distinct identity by limiting how the larger
society’s decisions influence the minority culture.48 The former request is referred to as internal
restrictions, while the latter refers to external protections. While internal restrictions relations risk
oppressing individuals within the minority group, external protections risk unfair treatment among
different minority groups.
As we will find, group rights claims that involve the request for internal restrictions are often met
with disapproval, especially in liberal democratic states. Liberalism places equal treatment, rights,
and freedoms of the individual over those of the group; this is a non-negotiable condition the liberal
state must always defend. However, group rights need not be rejected by the liberal state. Indeed,
the liberal state is naturally composed of group rights. The very condition of state sovereignty is
predicated on the collective right, which belongs to the collective, not the individuals among the
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collective. Individual citizens cannot claim a right to independence which can move to or isolate
the state. It is only through the collective exercise of state sovereignty that citizens can enjoy state
sovereignty.49 While individual rights may provide individuals with the autonomy needed to
pursue their conception of the good life, group rights may provide the same autonomy to protect
and pursue linguistic, cultural, and religious practices to maintain their group identity and dignity.
Avigail Eisenberg defends group rights by connecting parallels between conceptions of individuals
and groups. Eisenberg maintains that individual rights have been used to protect individual
differences by ensuring individuals are free to speak, think, believe, and associate freely. However,
she extends this conception and applies it to a group-based conception:
“The purpose of protecting group or individual difference is to enhance
individual well-being and to do so while recognizing that individual wellbeing is often dependent on the well-being of groups. But individuals and
groups are sometimes threatened by different kinds of circumstances and
therefore the means by which individual differences are protected might be
inadequate to protecting groups. … within the framework provided by the
difference approach, rights, whether individual or collective, are amongst the
means by which differences might be protected, but do not, on their own,
constitute the object to be protected."50
However, Eisenberg maintains that, while we may find value for individuals in granting group
rights, it is the individual who remains the central agent the state must seek to protect.

Limitations of Group Rights
While individual rights are universally applicable to all individuals, the conception of
group rights does not have the same application. Group rights may be granted, in a liberal state,
for the sake of individuals belonging to a particular group, but since the value of group rights is
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based on the potential value they provide to individuals belonging to groups, they must never
supersede the rights of the individual. If a cultural group is making a group right claim to the state
that requires individual members’ rights to be revoked, granting such rights cannot be justified.
Individuals cannot consent to revoke universal human rights, as they are basic foundations from
which all individuals can fulfil their human capacities so that they may attain human flourishing.
The capability approach is one way of understanding this concept of capabilities and functionings
in greater detail. The capabilities approach believes the advantages of individuals should be judged
by an individual’s capability to do things they have a reason to value.51 Amartya Sen constructed
the capabilities approach to be intentionally incomplete so that the framework may accommodate
differing conceptions of importance different cultures place on certain aspects of welfare.52 In the
capabilities approach, it matters not whether someone does something but whether they can do
something. For example, there is a difference between a wealthy person who decides to fast and a
starving person who lacks the capacity to eat. The similarity between the two is their lack of
functioning; the wealthy person and poor person share a lack of functioning to eat. However, the
difference exists in their capacity. The wealthy person has the capacity to eat; he just chooses not
to engage in the function. The poor person lacks the capacity to eat because, although he wants to,
he has no capacity to fulfil this desire of functioning.
Parekh emphasizes the importance of fully understanding a cultural practice before the majority
culture allows or prohibits the group from having such a right. This process engages with
intercultural evaluations and plays a central role in the accurate and dignified recognition of group
identities. Once a group decides to make a group right claim, they must appeal to the cultural
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authority of the practice and argue that such practice is binding to the culture. If the practice does
not violate society's contemporary public values, the claim should be granted. If the practice does
violate public values, the state may ask the minority culture to expand and clarify their arguments,
as they cannot and need not tolerate practices they deem to violate individual rights. 53 54
From there, cultural minority groups can argue that, while the practice may be unacceptable in
itself, it is central to the group’s way of life and, if prohibited, would compromise the group’s
identity.55 Parekh maintains that while the state is responsible for accommodating the way of life
of minority groups, it is not responsible for doing so at the expense of the larger society, especially
if the minority’s claim has not sufficiently justified the morality of the practice. In this stage of the
intercultural dialogic process, the state’s decision-makers must consider the difference between
intercultural cruelty and cultural practices the state simply does not like.56 While the opportunity
for dialogue between minority cultural groups must always be upheld, what remains conditional,
is whether the state may decide to permit certain practices. There are necessary conditions that
must be met if a liberal state is to permit cultural minority practices that exist beyond the majority
culture’s ethical customs: cultural group rights claims must not cause the limiting, diminishing or
revocation of rights, liberties, or dignity of any individual.
Cultural group rights claims must not limit the rights of any individuals - including those who are
members of the cultural minority group in question.57 If a cultural minority group believes young
girls should not go to school because they believe women only need to learn how to be
homemakers, this culture still does not have a right to prohibit young girls in their community the
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right to receiving a formal education. Since the discrimination is gender-based, denying rights to
particular individuals within their group is unjust, as the group denies fundamental liberal values
of equality and autonomy to particular members. In a liberal state, it is acknowledged that women
and men have equal intrinsic values that deserve respect and dignity. If a cultural group were to
deny the right of a particular individual within their group the ability to attend school as a means
to build their capacities so they may one day be fully autonomous and self-sufficient agents, the
liberal state must reject the accommodation request on the grounds of protecting the individual
rights of all citizens under the state.
Cultural group right claims must not limit the liberty of individual group members by treating the
group as a single unit rather than a unit composed of many individual and separable units. 58 For
example, if a culture believes states that women must not leave their husbands under any
circumstance, the cultural belief does not give individual members the right to supersede an
individual’s right to security of their person and, for example, stop a woman from fleeing from an
abusive marriage, for the safety of herself and her children. All individuals under liberal
democratic states are granted the liberty to be free from tyranny. Individuals are to be seen as
individuals first and as group members second. While this liberty primarily concerns the state, it
also extends to private parties. If a group acts in ways that limit the liberty of individual group
members in a tyrannical manner, the liberal state must prohibit these groups from continuing these
practices. Cultural group rights claims must not diminish the dignity of individuals, whether inside
or outside the group. Individuals may not have their dignity diminished because of a practice or
belief system.
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Avoiding Reductionism within Group-Centred Theories
Reductionism overgeneralizes and reduces individual identities, overlooks internal
diversities within groups, and creates a category that limits the possibility for cultural minorities
to be complex, multi-identifying individuals.59 The identity of the individual is important to the
individual because it can command them and influence how others see them.60 The individual can
only shape their internal identities, while those around them hold power in shaping their external
identity. If an individual is a cultural minority, the majority culture around them will most likely
have an insufficient understanding of their culture and so is likely to misrepresent the external
identity of the cultural minority identity. While the external identity of the individual cannot
fundamentally alter the internal identity, harm can come when these two identities are incongruent.
By taking autonomy away from the individual to form her own identity in the way she sees most
accurately reflects herself, she is othered by the majority culture around her. 61
While reductionism neglects to address internal interactions, it also neglects to address external
interactions. Suppose the majority culture accepts a reductionist version of minority cultural
identities. The reduction of identity can cause harm to the individuals being reduced, as they have
not been given a fair opportunity to accurately present how they would like to be identified by the
majority culture they exist in. It is of utmost importance for multicultural societies to avoid
popularizing reductionism as it can cause three detriments to individuals, which can then spread
to harm the broader society. Reductionism can cause alienation, resentment and even extremism
among minority groups. These may have an outcome that harms society if the individual minorities
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become extremists. However, it is also paramount to acknowledge the harms associated with being
alienated, having resentment, and turning to extremist measures. Experiencing alienation on
account of belonging to a minority culture will primarily negatively impact the individuals within
minority cultures, as they are rejected the opportunity of equal participation in the life of the
majority culture. Alienation may breed resentment, as it derives from an “imposed inferiority” that
the individual has no power to overturn.62 Resentment harms the individual as it denies them the
opportunity to forge their own identity — this denied opportunity may create an obsession that can
deeply harm their self-understanding.63 Resentment, being a source of anger left unaddressed, may
lead to acts of extremism.
In 2011, David Cameron gave a speech in Munich, addressing his concerns surrounding the
emergence of extremism and terrorism in Britain. In this speech, Cameron shared how he believed
"the doctrine of state multiculturalism" has caused groups of people to live separate lives and has
come at a great loss to British unity.64 However, multiculturalism cannot cause people to live
separate lives or become sectarian extremists. Multiculturalism promotes cultural pluralism by the
state and, more specifically, integration. Multiculturalism seeks to create a unified, interdependent,
and culturally diverse society. We begin to see the emergence of sectarianism, radicalism and
extremism when a segment of society feels they have been disrespected or undignified by the
majority culture or state.65
Terrorism is one form of violent extremism that "springs from human discontent with and
resentment of inequality and indifference and from widespread beliefs that violence is justified in
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the face of oppression and insult.”66 While we must not validate the targeted, intentional harm
terrorism causes to civilians, the state is responsible for learning why a segment of society feels so
disenfranchised that they believe reverting to violence is the best thing they can do to improve
their current situation. Cameron's blaming of multiculturalism as the cause for sectarian, extremist
terrorism inaccurately places the blame on a policy idea when the blame should be primarily placed
on the state's failure to employ a particular policy successfully.
As I have discussed in Chapter 1, multiculturalism has no inherent goodness or badness. It is a
policy that may bring benefit or detriment to society. States, societies, cultural makeups and the
groups and individuals which make up populations within states are explicitly unique. Because
societies and states are not the same everywhere, certain policies may greatly benefit one society
while causing great harm to another society elsewhere. Even so, there are so many nuances in
creating social cohesion for culturally diverse societies that it would be foolish to blame a policy
choice as the primary cause of extremism. Not once in his Munich speech did David Cameron
raise the possibility that perhaps there was also a failure from the British state to foster a sense of
belonging for the individuals belonging to minority cultures within their state who reverted to
extremism. To avoid feelings of alienation and resentment, the state must integrate cultural
minority groups, so they may feel they have an important role to play in the larger society to which
they belong.

Anthony J. Marsella, “Reflections on International Terrorism: Issues, Concepts, and Directions.,” in Understanding
Terrorism: Psychosocial Roots, Consequences, and Interventions, (Washington: American Psychological
Association, 2004), 13.
66

de Paiva 32

Chapter 3: Multiculturalism’s Insufficient Understanding
of Female Subordination
The discussion of internal minorities within multiculturalism situates itself predominantly
in feminist discourse because women are often the particular agents most affected by granting
group-differentiated rights. While almost every culture existing is patriarchal, the degrees of what
may be considered acceptable forms of subordination, oppression and harm differ greatly. As Okin
has highlighted, even the west would not pass a "no sex discrimination" test if it were applied to
the culture's private spheres.67 This topic is very serious, as it demands that multicultural theorists
account for and maintain the individual rights of those who are the worst off - in a Rawlsian spirit
but while clearly identifying women as citizens/heads of houses. This is why for Okin, “it is so
important that the relevant women be involved in the attempt to design the form of
multiculturalism that is most likely to benefit them and least likely to harm them.”68

The same hierarchical dynamics that we may use to distinguish power relations between the
majority culture and the many minority cultures can be used to distinguish the power dynamic
internal to each culture within a state. The discussion of minorities within minorities addresses
individuals within a minority culture who are disadvantaged compared to other members in their
cultural group, in the same way that power holders in a minority culture may be disadvantaged
compared to the majority culture. The discussion of internal minorities within multiculturalism
situates itself predominantly in feminist discourse because women are most often the agents
affected by the granting of group-differentiated rights. So, as we focus on women and their situated
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state in theories of multiculturalism, we will begin to see similarities in the existing power
hierarchies between the majority culture and minority culture, as well as women and men within
minority (and majority) cultures.

In what is to come, I will address four crucial components of consideration for a multicultural
theory that seeks to extend respect, dignity, and fairness to all individual citizens, with a particular
focus on protecting the individual rights of women belonging to minority cultures. First, in every
group claim to a multicultural accommodation, a critical sex-based evaluation must go into all
cultural requests. If I am right to argue that women are one of the most vulnerable groups of people
when it comes to claims to culture, then the state must ensure that all requests will benefit women
of minority cultures. Second, if a dialogic approach to multiculturalism is to be successful, it must
incorporate feminist considerations. The feminist dialogic approach acknowledges the presence of
reason and emotion as necessary components of authentic dialogue. It demands the authentic
participation of women in dialogue, as women have been historically excluded from the dialogical
process in all cultures, including the west. Third, I will address the right of exit and membership
in cultural minority groups. The final section will address the failings of the dominant approach to
multiculturalism – the right of exit – it suffers from dire a misunderstanding of identity and culture.
The dominant approach appeals to a muddled conception of rights to resolve intercultural conflicts
but does not accurately understand or separate individual identity from the identity one has from
membership in a particular group. In this final section, I will show how a deliberative approach
can help ensure respect, dignity, and fairness exists for all individual members of society as it will
show how a failure to understand culture and identity – as is done in the dominant approach to
cultural conflict – can harm minority members –of cultural minority groups.
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Critical Sex-Based Evaluations of Cultural Requests
The late Susan Okin continues to be a large influence within feminist analyses for theories
of multiculturalism. In Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women? Okin highlighted two important yet
under-considered criticisms of multiculturalism. First, many theorists seeking a theory for group
rights tended to treat cultures as unchanging monoliths. However, cultures are naturally changing
and are not frozen in time. Thus, seeking to freeze cultures in time will only make such cultures
inauthentic as their current existence would be solely based on artificial protections. When dealing
with factors of identity, it is important to avoid reductionist thinking, as treating cultures as
monoliths will only increase the chances of reductionism. Second, those advocating for group
rights completely neglect or inadequately consider the private sphere in their theoretical
construction. Okin argued that group rights could easily become anti-feminist because many
cultural minority groups who try to claim cultural group rights do so on the grounds of
subordinating the women within their group.69 Further, the covert nature of sex discrimination
within cultural minority groups is far too persistent to assume that their liberal nature in public will
translate to liberal values within their private life.70
Kymlicka regards cultures who overtly discriminate against women as not deserving of group
rights. However, his avoidance of addressing covert discrimination makes his theory susceptible
to permitting anti-feminist groups a claim to group rights.71 In Kymlicka's response to Okin's
criticisms, he accepts that his account of internal restrictions is too narrow, leaving oppressed
members of cultural minority groups vulnerable to further subordination.72 However, Kymlicka
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disagrees with Okin's point that multiculturalism and feminism are opposing theories. Feminism
and multiculturalism experience the same issue of invisibility. Where Okin rightly argues that
liberal theories have and continue to assume the citizen is a man, Kymlicka is just as right in his
argument that liberal theories have and continue to assume the citizen shares the same language
and national culture. However, in a multicultural society, such assumptions would be foolish to
make. Theorists never ask what institutions would be chosen by cultural minorities, just as theorists
never ask what institutions would be chosen by women.73 So, we must address the goal of
diminishing all injustice – whether cultural or sex-based – as equally important; we cannot address
one group-based injustice while denying the legitimacy of another.

Deliberative Feminist Approach
The deliberative feminist approach utilizes dialogic ethics for deliberative democratic
purposes and seeks to create a holistic strategy for dignified, fair, and honest dialogue. The feminist
approach to dialogue for cultural conflicts or negotiations contains two components:
acknowledging both rational and emotional presence as necessary components of authentic
dialogue, and ensuring the authentic participation of women in dialogue, as women have been
historically excluded from the dialogical process in all cultures, including the west. Since women
are just as crucial for a culture’s survival as men, their participation in shaping their culture, as it
naturally changes over time, is of equal importance to that of the participation of men. Long are
the days when we believed women were agents incapable of rationality or logic. Even the least
patriarchal cultures within the west have been structured by and for men, with a targeted and
intentional exclusion of women. This is an undesirable situation, as it prohibits a significant
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proportion of society from engaging in the negotiations needed to form the world they will live in.
Their exclusion from forming social institutions leads to Okin’s criticism that the society one lives
in was made by men, for men. It was only through women vocalizing their concerns, forcing their
participation in dialogue, that changes could be made. So, as the liberal state now acknowledges
women as agents capable of rationality and logic, it is the responsibility of the liberal state to ensure
women of all cultures are present in the dialogic processes of their culture, especially in matters
that will have a direct and primary impact on their lives. Since powerholders in cultural minority
groups are often in their places of power through the help of their cultural justificatory claims to
subordinate some members and empower other members, there is an incentive – for the power
holders – to maintain this power imbalance. For this reason, there is a real threat to internal powersharing when powerholders are allowed to invoke cultural claims as a justification to maintain
dominance over the marginalized members through exclusion in dialogue.74
In John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice, he specifies that the most appropriate representatives for the
original position are “heads of families.”75 However, Rawls’ theory has been met with strong
criticism from feminists for its assumption of the masculine individual as superior, necessary and
sufficient for adequate delegation, and what this means for women as they exist in contemporary
society. Carole Pateman highlights that while Rawls’s original position is a complete logical
construction, he has “already claimed that parties have 'descendants' (for whom they are
concerned), and Rawls states that he will generally view the parties as· 'heads of families'.”76 So
Rawls claims that the participants in the original position are reasoning entities but fails to mention
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the importance of emotional presence, making Rawls’s representatives similar in character to
Locke, Hobbes and Rousseau’s conception of the individual citizen as being explicitly
masculine.77 Rawls’ theory purports a false dichotomy between reason and emotion, where reason
is valued above all else, and emotion is disregarded or nullified in theories of justice. To further
the questionings of Rawls’ masculine conception of the individual, Okin states, “the term ‘femaleheaded households’ is used only in referencing households without resident adult males, [which]
tends to suggest that it is assumed that any present male adult takes precedence over a female as
the household or family head.”78 The very idea that a “female-headed household” must include a
modifier, to tell the reader the head of the household is indeed a woman, tells us that women
leading households exists outside of unconscious assumptions of who the particular head of the
household may be.
In this assumption of the individual as solely masculine, we “ignore the standpoint of the concrete
other,” which contradicts the purpose behind the veil of ignorance, as we no longer look from the
perspective of outsidedness.79 For Rawls, the other cannot be different from oneself because
difference is yet to exist. While Rawls’s theory abstracts from difference, rather than denying them
outright, it is in Rawls’ theory where differences are nullified, which can cause conceptual issues
of justice; by assuming every agent in dialogue is the same, we disregard significant differences
that ought to be considered when creating a theory of justice. Young shares similar concerns
surrounding the veil of ignorance, as it “removes any differentiating characteristics among
individuals, and thus ensures that all will reason from identical assumptions and the same universal
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point of view.”80 However, we know this is not true, as the world of considerations for justice must
assume that individuals will form thoughts that are separate and distinct from others.
So, even the most complete and commendable theory of justice does not suffice the needs of
minorities, particularly women. While I have been addressing the needs of women within cultural
minority groups, the same issues present in considerations for cultural minorities are also present
in concerns from majority cultures within the west. In this similarity, we may see how the feminist
deliberative method can explain where we may improve a dialogic approach to multiculturalism.
Utilizing the existing feminist deliberative literature that addresses the issues of sex-based injustice
within the majority culture may be helpful if we apply a similar formulation to sex-based injustices
as they occur in minority cultures existing in multicultural societies. Indeed, “the alternative to a
moral theory founded on the assumption of impartial reason, then, is a communicative ethics. …
Moral rationality should be understood as dialogic, the product of the interaction of a plurality of
subjects under conditions of equal power that do not suppress the interests of any.”81 So, it is the
very fact that women in minority cultural groups face this hardship and the additional hardship of
being an internal minority that special attention and consideration must be provided.

Rejecting Masculine Superiority Assumptions in Dialogue
In political communication, greetings or public acknowledgements are valuable, as it
ensures all participants acknowledge individuals and the parties the individual belongs to, coming
from a different perspective, and making a different claim.82 Ensuring an official greeting is crucial
for effective and respectful dialogue, as it extends integrity and goodwill, and it ensures the party
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with more power refers to the claimant party in the second person (direct communication) rather
than in the third person (indirect communication).
The idea of greeting also encompasses a component of dialogue and deliberative democracy that
has been rejected as important; emotional presence. Hanna Pitkin has highlighted the historical
pattern of rationality being placed as the most important component representatives must maintain
in dialogue. Thinkers such as Edmund Burke and James Madison upheld this sentiment, as they
believed “the representatives will be superior, dispassionate men, calmly debating in the light of
reason, and so will refuse to give way to the factious desires of their constituents.”83 However, I
find something wholly missing from this idea of dialogue encompassing only the rational and nonemotional human. At the very centre of it, humans are both rational and emotional creatures, so if
there is an insistence to reject emotional presence from dialogue, then there is an insistence to
reject the very nature of humanity. To greet and acknowledge the presence and purpose of an
individual and their party in dialogue is to exist beyond reasonableness; we must have emotional
components present in representatives of dialogue if we are to embrace our humanity, dignity, and
goodwill. The masculine archetype of rationality and logic was created in a time when women
were seen as only emotional and incapable of holding such capacities for logic or rationality. Yet,
as we live in a time where it is acknowledged that women are just as capable as men of being
logical and emotional creatures, we must re-evaluate this assumption of rationality and logic being
sufficient conditions to engage in the political process.
Another important component of dialogue – as highlighted by Young – is the use of rhetorical
communication as an emotive tool for communication.84 Rhetorical speech should be seen to be
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just as necessary as rational speech, as they both play different roles but are just as important to
ensure dialogue holistically encompasses both human elements of emotional and rational
intelligence. On the one hand, rational speech has historically been seen as the speech of
dispassionate logic; those who promote this sentiment sought to “not reach understanding with
others, but only to manipulate their thoughts and feelings in directions that serve the speaker’s own
ends.”85 On the other hand, rhetoric uses emotional, figurative language, seeks to show a
willingness to connect with others in dialogue, and defend their claims with reason. Emotional and
rational presence are both necessary features of dialogue; it is not enough for an argument to be
based fully on rhetoric, as there is no logical foundation. However, a dialogue void of emotional
presence is just as flawed.
Engaging in a dialogue where the majority knows they do not have a sufficient understanding of
the other side’s arguments puts one in a vulnerable position of not knowing; to be in a state of
vulnerability is to be in a state of emotion. This sort of vulnerability – to accept that one does not
know – is important to connect with and respect the other parties as it “does not pretend (in the
name of empathy or devotion) to duplicate their space or time; it enters another worldview and
then … returns to its own place.”86 To reject the benefits emotional presence can have in dialogue
also rejects any opportunity for a fair and honest attempt to listen and learn about the claims being
made by a cultural minority group. So, it is in breaking the old assumption of masculine superiority
– so attributes of emotion are valued as much as rationality – that we may find a more holistic and
effective form of dialogue. Through rhetoric, one can share their ideas and desires while
connecting with one’s audience by acknowledging they are a particular person belonging to a
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particular group whom we are particularly speaking with.87 Through rhetoric, one humanizes their
discussants and extends to them the dignity and fairness they deserve as rational and emotional
participants in dialogue.

Right of Exit and Membership
The right of exit – proposed as a laissez-faire liberal theory by Jeff Spinner-Halev – argues
that cultural autonomy can supersede individual rights if group members have a safe and
reasonable opportunity to exit their cultural group. While theorists, such as Avigail Eisenberg,
have a much stricter liberal rights-based approach, the right of exit, as proposed by Spinner-Halev,
does not place particular importance on individual rights, as he believes that “the injustice of
allowing for individual rights and equality to be undermined must be balanced against the injustice
of imposing reform on oppressed groups.”88 Spinner-Halev addresses the Santa Clara Pueblo case,
where sex-based membership rules prohibit women who marry outside of the tribe from continued
membership and prohibits her children from claiming membership. In this case, Spinner-Halev
notes that the United States’ moral authority to tell Native Americans how to run their own affairs
is weak.89 He also claims that few indigenous peoples observe a classical liberal conception of
individual rights.90 However, the validity of these two claims is questionable. The origins of this
sex-based discriminatory membership rule were not a natural creation of the Pueblo people but an
outcome of the US government’s heavy influence on creating a policy that mirrored the
government’s sex-based discriminatory citizenship regulations. As Song points out, in the 1930s,
the US government pressured the Santa Clara Pueblos and other Indigenous groups to adopt a
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membership structure where restrictions should be along delineations of sex.91 During this time in
history, the US government had sex-discriminatory citizenship laws. While a man who married a
foreign woman would have their wife automatically become a US citizen, women who married
foreign men had their citizenship put in jeopardy, especially if she were to move to her husband’s
country.92
So, in 1939, when the Santa Clara Pueblo membership rule was limited to only women who marry
within the tribe and men who marry in or out of the tribe, it aligned with the US’s legislation on
sex-based citizenship laws. In the case Spinner-Halev presents, he suggests that if Indigenous
members do not like an aspect of their cultures, “indigenous peoples … can always leave the
group” and “leaving a tribe is comparatively easy.”93 While he does stipulate that he does not want
to “minimize the difficulty of exit,” he rejects the scope and validity of the psychological argument,
as the state cannot possibly respond to the claims of every individual group member.94
For a woman to leave her entire life behind on account of marrying someone outside of her culture
is not a just trade-off, and simply having a “right to exit” does not seek to rectify the injustice in
any way. If culture is valuable to the individual, we must not prioritize the individuals within the
culture who are the powerholders or benefactors of oppressive practices. Special protections,
accommodations or exemptions are all possible tools that may be used to alleviate or resolve
existing oppressions, not to continue or create new oppressions. So, while the right of exit is surely
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an important component of multiculturalism – individual members of cultural groups must be safe
and free to exit their cultural groups – it is not sufficient to prevent harm to individuals.
Frank Lovett suggests that we distinguish between the voluntary participants and those impacted
by a particular practice.95 The Santa Clara Pueblo case is a clear example of how laws created
strictly by men (belonging to both majority and minority cultures) can restrict women's autonomy,
limiting their life choices in ways that are not limited to the men of their group. The right of exit
is a necessary condition for liberal multiculturalism, but it is far from sufficient. The sexdiscriminatory membership law used by the Santa Clara Pueblo people was heavily influenced by
the US government and did not involve the participation of the group’s women – who are the
primary impacted agents. While the majority culture influenced this law, it was also decided
without the input of the primarily impacted agents, making the legitimacy and fairness very
muddled, at the absolute least. The next two sections will highlight two necessary conditions that
must be met for a right of exit to be a justified and fair choice: investigating potentials for coercion
and including women in the dialogic process.

When the Right of Exit is Nullified
Focusing on the act of exit, Raphael Cohen-Almagor raises two issues: internal and
designated coercion. First, internal coercion takes place when “a given sub-culture in society
denies some freedoms and rights to a certain group living in that same culture,” and though “we
may feel that some form of coercion is being exercised,” insiders may not feel as though they are
being coerced.96 Thus, internal coercion may create a unique problem, where outsiders claim a
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group uses manipulation, legitimization and rationalization systems to make the women within
their group accept the denial of their individual rights to appease the group’s rights claim.
Second, designated coercion occurs when women within patriarchal and oppressive groups fail to
fully internalize the systems of oppression. In this instance, they realize they have been denied
their fundamental rights and seek to remove themselves from their group. In this instance, they
want to engage in the act of exit.97 However, the act of exit and its potential harms exist far beyond
simply leaving a group. The act of exit also encompasses psychological and social ramifications
that may come from losing a piece of one’s identity. While the liberal state is responsible for
protecting weaker parties, seeking to protect or regain their rights, the individual deciding to leave
their group will also have to accept a change in identity, especially when “belonging to such a
group operates as one of the constitutive elements of one’s identity.”98 Since the act of exit involves
leaving the group’s influence and renouncing one’s group identity, liberal states ought to be
conscious of these hardships and provide economic support and social and psychological resources
for women revoking their membership within oppressive groups. For this reason, the liberal state
has a particularly positive duty to help disadvantaged individuals by a cultural group’s undignified
treatment to which they primarily belong.
In instances where a cultural minority group approaches the state for accommodations or
exemptions that will impact the treatment of individuals in the group from those in or outside their
cultural group, it is not sufficient to present the options as either exit one’s group or consent to
unjust treatment or revocation of individual rights. Consent is a legal tool used in western judicial
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systems that forms the basis for autonomy, which is necessary for human flourishing.99 The liberal
state must be alert to the conditions that inform individual choice and ensure that such choices to
consent are not made under conditions of duress, coercion, or exploitation.100 If power-holders in
a group are proposing an accommodation or exemption that will severely harm the individual
rights of particular group members, the option must not be limited to consent or exit. It is not an
autonomous decision to consent to harmful or irreversible acts if the alternative is to leave one’s
family or community.

Failings of the Dominant Approach to Group Rights
The dominant approach to multiculturalism heavily utilizes theories like Spinner-Halev’s
in addressing group right dispute claims. However, as used in the dominant approach, the right of
exit is heavily flawed, as it suffers from a misunderstanding of identity and culture. Eisenberg
charges the dominant approach to group rights disputes as appealing to rights that are thought to
resolve intercultural conflicts but do not accurately understand individual identity.
The dominant approach leads us to mistake the reasonings behind the court's decisions in cases
concerning cultural conflicts.101 When people are asked to choose between different identities as
a means of resolution, the lack of ability to allow differing identities to exist within an individual
is a fatal flaw in this approach. Another issue created by the dominant approach’s
misunderstandings of identity leads us to misunderstand why some people reject liberalindividualist values, superseding their individual rights for their cultural group-based rights.102 In
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cases where individuals want to sacrifice their individual rights for their cultural communities, the
matter is complex and is in no way easy to overcome through having a right of exit. In some cases,
such as clitoridectomy, these sacrifices made by individuals cannot be reversed by simply leaving
one’s group. The dominant approach sees the identity of the individual as an individual and as a
group member as separable identities, both multiplicities existing in the individual. However,
identities must not be something people have to separate from themselves to resolve conflict.
Identities naturally exist in a multiplicity and are muddled within every individual.103
A failure to acknowledge the complex and often conflicting identities individuals have within
themselves reduces them to omit certain ways they may desire to define themselves; this does not
permit the individual to choose her identity in a fair or free way. If one is forced to choose her
identity, where something she desires must be omitted, we reduce and limit her identity so we may
understand her better. However, this reduction of identity may only result in a synthetic and
inauthentic understanding, as we have not provided the individual with a fair, honest and dignified
opportunity to express herself from the multiple facets of identity within her.

Does The Right of Exit Mean Excluding Women from Dialogue?
While the right of exit must exist in a liberal state, I argue that if a right of exit is to be just,
the agents most impacted by decisions must be provided with an equal opportunity to engage in
dialogue, as it has the potential to change the future of their culture and their life. Suppose a cultural
group approaches the state to recognize a practice that harms women, such as traditional
clitoridectomy. In that case, women must be allowed an equal opportunity to engage in dialogue
to expose potential cross-cultural deception that may go unnoticed by the state, which is ill-
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informed on minority cultures and their claims. Including women in cultural dialogue is important,
particularly because there is no universal understanding of subordination, and intervention into
cultural minority groups lacking women's participation fails to respect these women's autonomy,
nor does it genuinely seek to serve their interests.104 In the case of clitoridectomy, it is important
to ensure the women of the particular cultural group are present in dialogue to voice their honest
opinions, sharing personal experiences and harms that may have gone unmentioned – intentionally
or unintentionally – by the group’s male powerholding members. Using the mechanisms of
dialogue proposed by Young – greetings and rhetoric – the state can extend dignity and respect to
these cultural groups while ensuring the group’s most vulnerable members are represented and
their individual rights protected. While the state may not ultimately approve such requests, what
is most important is the opportunity given to groups to voice their honest, fair and complete
reasonings that ensures the state takes the minority cultures within their borders seriously,
recognizing that – although they may disagree on what particular notions of justice or the good life
are – the group is composed of rational and emotive individuals, who derive a sense of dignity and
pride from the groups they take membership in.
As noted by Cohen-Almagor, some groups face designated coercion, where members do not feel
they are being subordinated. At the same time, the state may believe minority members are too
ignorant to know better. Here, the state must acknowledge they do not know the minority culture
like the culture’s members do, the state does not live their culture as they do, and if the state plans
to help, they need to truly listen to the arguments extended by the cultural minority group. It will
not always be the case that these cultural claims will be approved, but it is through the logical
process that we may assess the facts, and through the emotive process that we may assess the
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desires, what it means for the individuals of the group, and what it means for the rest of society.105
It is only through a deliberative process that assesses the fundamental importance individual group
members attach to their claims put forward in coming to a decision that we will have an inclusive,
fair, honest and just system of dialogue.

Conclusion
I began this paper with a discussion on the conceptual realities of culture. I asked two
questions. First, why is culture valuable? Second, in what way is culture valuable to the individual,
and how can the cosmopolitan alternative diminish the value we derive from cultures? In Chapter
2, I sought to better understand theories of multiculturalism as it exists in its broadest sense. In this
section, I explored concepts of recognition, group rights, and the limitations of group rights from
a liberal perspective. It is here where the foundation of understanding multiculturalism was
formed. Chapter 3 explored multiculturalism from a feminist lens; it was in this final chapter that
critical sex-based evaluations of culture were explored. The deliberative feminist approach was
heavily utilized to further my theory of dialogic ethics, as it particularly related to minorities within
minority groups. It was through understanding the assumptions of masculine superiority within
dialogic traditions that showed how much of the dialogue on multiculturalism fails to account for
the female citizen in the same way men are accounted for. This led to the discussion of the right
of exit by cultural minority group members, exploring how the dominant approach to the right of
exit could too easily work against the interest and individual rights of women belonging to cultural
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minority groups. This brought us to the final discussion, where I asked whether the dominant
approach to the right of exit is simply a means to exclude women from cultural dialogue.
Multiculturalism has been predominantly adopted as a liberal theory and defended by many liberal
theorists for the potential good it can do for the liberal state and its citizens. However, as has been
shown, there are many opportunities for multiculturalism to work against liberal values,
threatening values of autonomy, dignity and fairness. Throughout this paper, I explored theories
heavily used in multiculturalism and proposed an alternative, heavily rooted in the feminist
dialogic tradition, to intend greater opportunities for fairness that capture the participation of
women within minority groups. This essay proposed a theory of multiculturalism, heavily rooted
in feminist theories of dialogic ethics and shows how a heavily masculine conception of the citizen,
which oppresses women belonging to both majority and minority cultures, is the human flourishing
and flourishing of the larger society. It was in this same oppressive assumption that the majority
culture can oppress minority cultures. In these particular situations, the state and theories of
multiculturalism must seek the special protection of women within minority cultural groups to
ensure their individual rights and dignities are protected and respected. So, there continues to be a
delicate line of liberty and dignity that must be maintained. The liberal state must recognize and
respect minority cultures while maintaining individual rights of individual members within
minority cultures, seeking to minimize opportunities for oppression beyond the majority-minority
cultural divide. The liberal theory of multiculturalism I put forward in this paper emphasized the
importance of the state liberal always maintaining the protections of individual rights of citizens
over group rights while being open to considering and granting group rights where there is no
conflict with the rights of any individual group members or individuals who exist outside of the
group.
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